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Abstract. The neurobiology of affection is becoming established as a new sub-discipline 
that focuses on the study and understanding of human emotional experience. It is a sci-
entific discipline that has emerged from neurosciences, on the basis that we can now 
only advance towards a global understanding of human emotions and of their altera-
tions by widening the horizons and methods available to study the emotional life. Here, 
we present the current contrast between the phenomenological and the neuroscientific 
analysis of emotions. We propose that it is necessary to maintain an interdisciplinary 
dialogue between these two approaches and we think that this complementation will 
be especially beneficial for the field of clinical neuroscience and anthropology.
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Introduction
Emotional experiences, both emotions and feelings, have attracted the at-
tention of some of greatest thinkers and philosophers since ancient times. 
Indeed, it can be considered that they hold the key to understanding the 
meaning of human life itself. However, many different points of view have 
been adopted when considering these experiences, often provoking more 
discussion than agreement. Thus, while at times they have been considered 
to be specific aspects of intellectual experience, a kind of confuse judge-
ment, on other occasions they are considered to be irrational passions or 
blind moods1. Similarly, emotional experiences have too often been in-
terpreted on the basis of a predetermined and presupposed theory of the 
human being, usually extremely difficult to demonstrate, which has the 
inherent risk of distorting the original nature of these experiences.
In the early 20th century, a philosophical school emerged in Germa-
ny that aims to avoid the dangers associated with such interpretations. 
This school was that of phenomenology, founded by Franz Brentano 
(Brentano 1995) and Edmund Husserl (Husserl 1999) and it has since 
become increasingly influential. The key to this way of thinking is its 
method: it carefully describes the experience as a whole whilst avoiding 
all theories prior to the description of experience phenomena. Herein 
we shall consider what is known as plain phenomenology (first-person 
perspective) rather than hetero-phenomenology (third-person perspec-
tive) (Siewert 2007; Drummond 2007; 2008). Max Scheler was the phe-
nomenologist who paid most attention to the field of emotions. Indeed, 
Scheler is known above all for his defence of the existence of the unusual 
emotional objects known as values. However, the richness of his descrip-
tions of emotional life should not just be simply reduced to this thesis, 
as they are far richer. Scheler is indeed responsible for proposing the 
most complete classification and description of emotional experiences 
1 For the specific meaning of feeling, affection, emotion, passion and mood, see (Lombo and 
Giménez-Amaya 2013, 100–102). It is also very interesting to note the neurobiological 
meaning of feeling of emotion (Damasio 2011).
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to date (Scheler 1973). A sign of this richness is the influence of Schel-
er’s analyses on other thinkers of that time: from psychiatrists such as 
Kurt Schneider (Schneider 2007; Glazinski 2001; Krahl and Schifferdecker 
1998) to psychologists such as Felix Krüger (Krüger 1918; 1928), Philipp 
Lersch (Lersch 1938) or Ludwig Klages (Klages 1936). Therefore, we will 
take Scheler as a model philosophical approach, in this case phenome-
nological, to the world of emotions.
According to Scheler, emotional life is a different sphere to intellec-
tual life (representation, judgement, reason) and it prompts cognitive 
or tendential life (ranging from spontaneous to voluntary movements) 
(Sánchez-Migallón 2005). However, the greatest problem concerns the cri-
teria to classify and describe the experiences in this sphere. In agreement 
with the inspiration behind phenomenology as a whole, Scheler believed 
that the main criterion to distinguish certain emotional experiences from 
others, which naturally does not exclude any later criteria, is the property 
known as intentionality: in other words whether or not these experiences 
refer to a content and if they do, how (Goldie 2002). We will see that this 
criterion actually permitted him to discover two very productive classifi-
cation methods (Figure 1). The fact that some or all emotional experiences 
have bodily manifestations is a secondary, and indeed accidental, criterion 
for Scheler, which is why he does not distinguish between emotions and 
feelings. In this respect, he diverges from the tradition of following the 
etymological origin of these two terms, although his approach is closer to 
common usage. The key for a phenomenologist is that emotional experi-
ences are just that, in other words that they are experienced consciously: 
without awareness we cannot talk of experience and with it, although it 
may only be that experienced in dreams, it is fundamental to describe the 
content experienced. The concept of experience used by Scheler is phe-
nomenological, which means experience in its broadest sense and not sim-
ply empirical (Frings 1997).
By contrast, from a neuroscientific point of view the distinction be-
tween emotions (the physical changes experienced due to an internal or 
external stimulus) and feelings (the conscious experience of an emotional 
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state, which is therefore subsequent) predominates (Tsuchiya and Adolphs 
2007; Damasio 1999). This situation would appear to be based on the sig-
nificant progress made towards understanding the concomitant neurobi-
ological processes that form the basis of emotions. However, does neuro-
science have a model that explains what we really experience, as suggested 
by phenomenology? Can we draw parallels between emotional experiences 
and neurobiological processes? Or is complementarity between different 
approaches and methods more necessary than ever?
Let us consider first of all how we can establish a system to study emo-
tional life from a phenomenological perspective, in this case that proposed 
by Scheler.
1. Phenomenological classification of emotional experiences 
according to Scheler
We saw above that intentionality is the basic phenomenological criterion 
for experiences. On this basis, Scheler makes a distinction between those 
emotional experiences that are not at all, or not directly, intentional, in 
other words those which do not internally and consciously directly refer 
to any specific content, and those experiences that are (Figure 1, I). He 
refers to the former as “feeling-states” (A) and to the latter as “intentional 
feelings” (B). Thus, Scheler’s theory cannot simply be considered to be 
a cognitive theory. However, Scheler also recognises that at times we simul-
taneously experience mutually incompatible feeling-states and intentional 
feelings (for example physical pain and emotional happiness). This leads 
Scheler to establish a new classification based on the psychological proper-
ty known as “depth” (II), which can be differentiated into four strata (a-d).
Thus, Scheler’s concept results in two parallel and interconnected clas-
sifications (Figure 1), whereby both non-intentional and intentional emo-
tions can exist in different depth strata.
Let us consider the classification by intentionality first of all. Scheler 
proposes different types of emotions or feelings within classes A and B, 
indicating their main traits and providing examples.
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Figure 1
Emotional experiences according to Scheler
I. According 
to the 
intentionality
(A) Feeling-states (not directly intentional: Figure 2)
(B) Intentional feelings (Figure 3)
II. According 
to the 
psychological 
depth
(Figure 4)
(a) Sensible feelings
(b) Feelings of the living body (as states) & of life (as functions)
(c) Pure emotional feelings (pure feelings of the ego)
(d) Spiritual feelings (feelings of the personality)
Class (A) concerns feeling-states and it contemplates three different 
states according to the type and degree of the possible indirect intention-
ality (Figure 2). The first of these contains the “pure states” (a), a set of 
totally non-intentional experiences with absolutely no conscious content 
of reference. These are the sensations and states in which we feel ourselves 
to be emotionally qualified to some degree and which may range from any 
pain or pleasure that can be sensed to an overall mood. In these cases we 
experience and therefore, we are aware of an emotion within ourselves 
(in one part of our body or in our body as a whole) without noticing an-
ything different within ourselves. We know that these states have been 
caused by an external or internal stimulus and we may even know what 
that object is, although our awareness of this object is not included in the 
emotional experience. As such, we can experience the emotion without 
knowing what the object is and if it is known, it can be disregarded and the 
emotion will remain.
Secondly, we have the affections or passions (b), highly dynamic emo-
tions that can nevertheless be experienced passively. These experiences 
are felt within a person but to some extent they have their own life and 
dynamism. Emotions of this type include anger or fear. As before, attention 
in these states is also directed towards the person emotionally affected to 
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a certain degree. In contrast, the dynamic nature of these emotions means 
that they are directed towards the object that caused them. This means 
that attention can be paid to the object, perhaps in order to act against it in 
some way. However, the object is not captured by anger as anger itself can-
not capture or perceive anything but rather, it arises in the face of another 
type of representation and feeling (intentional). Proof of this is that anger 
or fear, as affections, can separate themselves from their original causa-
tive object and direct them towards another object (fact or person) whilst 
remaining as identical emotions. For this reason they can be characterised 
as “secondary intentions”.
The third type of feeling-state (c) concerns what Scheler refers to as 
emotional “reactions of response”, such as happiness, sadness or enthusi-
asm. This is a type of non-intentional emotion as there is no association 
or mention of any objective quality. In these emotions we primarily and di-
rectly experience ourselves, although they are still states. However, in these 
emotions a relationship and direction towards an object also arises. This is 
not just a coincidental relationship that may eventually change but rather 
a meaningful relationship. The happiness felt about something means that 
we have captured or felt the sense that this something is something worthy 
of happiness. This is why these reactions, although still pure reactions, are 
based on an intentional feeling.
Clearly, in our emotional life we frequently move from one of these 
three types of emotions to another.
Class (B) concerns the intentional feelings and it also contains three 
types (Figure 3), although this time based on the type of intentional ob-
ject or content to which they refer. They all possess a direct reference to 
the content rather than to the emotion itself: they are a “feel something”, 
similar to judging or believing in something (Cairns 2000). First of all we 
have here the “feelings of the feeling-states” (a), where we experience all 
types of feeling-states as objective according to their emotional quality, 
for example our feeling of pain. The same pain can be felt intentionally in 
many ways, for example suffering it calmly or angrily. It is therefore a dif-
ferent and secondary feeling to the actual state felt. Furthermore, we can 
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feel both our own feeling-states and those of other people. The latter are 
feelings of sympathy that Scheler discusses extensively elsewhere (Scheler 
1970). Scheler characterises this emotional intentionality as original as it 
immediately determines the internal state of the person.
The second type of emotion, the so-called feelings of objective emo-
tional characteristics of the atmosphere (b), is as curious as it is real. In 
this type of emotion, what is felt or experienced is clearly an objective 
emotional characteristic. However, this quality is not experienced as re-
siding within the person (either ourselves or others), but rather in natural 
objects within the environment. The examples given by Scheler are highly 
suggestive: the restfulness of a river, serenity of the skies, and sadness of 
a landscape. It is clear that restfulness, serenity or sadness cannot reside 
in inanimate objects. What actually occurs is that not only do we feel our 
mood upon capturing these objects but also, we experience these emotion-
al characteristics in these objects and proceeding from them.
Finally, we have the feelings of values (c). According to Scheler, in these 
emotions we experience genuine emotional qualities, which he calls val-
ue qualities. This type of feeling is fully directed towards these qualities. 
Indeed, it can also be accompanied by a corresponding feeling-state, al-
though this state is somewhat different and not necessary (for example, 
Figure 2
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I can capture the value of something without feeling attracted to it, or I can 
feel unworthy of something of whose value I am aware). For this reason 
these feelings possess traits that make them cognitive: their complete in-
tentionality, their occasional or one-off character, the capacity to be real-
ised or not (and to further feel their valuable quality) and their capacity to 
be understood according to the sense of a valued object rather than simply 
being explicable by its cause.
Value qualities, however, have two different structural properties: their 
own particular quality and their range or standing with respect to other 
values. On the basis of these qualities, there are also various, essentially 
different, feelings of values. The specific emotions in which we experi-
ence the particular quality of each value (for example, aesthetic values as 
opposed to ethical ones, or subtle variations within each group) are the 
so-called intentional functions of feeling (d). By contrast, those feelings 
that refer to the range of value qualities form their own type: the so-called 
emotional acts (e). According to Scheler, these constitute a stratum of emo-
tional life that lies above functions. The range of values can be referred to 
in two ways. Firstly, by preferring or postponing (f), in other words captur-
ing the values according to their hierarchical range, either higher or lower, 
and secondly, by loving or hating (g). Love and hate form the highest stra-
tum in emotional life. They are feelings that fill our self emotionally, so to 
speak, although their active and intentional character distinguishes them 
from feelings states (even though the latter accompany love and hate). 
Love and hate are fully directed towards their object, usually other people, 
and we can only talk of the ensuing subjective state in another sense and 
only secondarily. One sign of this active and intentional character of love 
and hate is that both feelings reveal new higher or lower values in their 
object. Furthermore, according to Scheler these feelings are the condition 
and driving force of all human emotions and tendencies, and even of all 
cognitive interests. Scheler even goes so far as to define a human person 
as essentially a loving being.
Now let us consider the classification according to depth strata (Fig-
ure 4). As we have seen, Scheler noted that we sometimes experience both 
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feeling-states and intentional feelings together, which are nevertheless mu-
tually and qualitatively incompatible (positive and negative, for example). 
This simultaneity is not a problem for feelings or sensible emotions (a), in 
other words those located bodily, which can be experienced in various parts 
of the body. The problem arises when feelings appear simultaneously that 
can either affect and that refer directly to the organism as a whole (b), or 
that do not refer to the organism and only affect it secondarily, which can 
be experienced as states (c) or as active feelings alone (d). For example, 
a person may be happy and yet also suffer physical pain, they may feel sen-
sible pleasure when desperate, or they can also be calm and serene in the 
middle of a serious misfortune (such as an important loss of good fortune), 
even though it is impossible to be happy in this case. They might even drink 
a glass of good wine and appreciate its aroma whilst feeling unhappy.
Therefore, in order to discuss simultaneous existence, exactly as it is 
experienced, Scheler proposes extending the emotional life into the inte-
Figure 3
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Figure 4
The Stratification of the Emotional Life
EMOTIONAL STRATA
OBJECTIVE POLE:
rank of value
SUBJECTIVE POLE:
structure of the human existence
(FEELINGS)
(a) sensible feelings
values of the agreeable and 
disagreeable
a delineated part of the lived body
(sensitive pain and pleasure, sensualism)
(b) feelings of the lived body (as states) & feelings of life (as functions)
life-values or vital values lived-body-ego
(fear, expectation, tiredness, freshness, daze, consternation, aversion and sympathy, 
like and dislike, appetite, vigour, oppression, angst, shame, lust, sexual attraction)
(c) pure psychic feelings (pure feelings of the ego)
spiritual values psychic ego, without mediation of the 
lived-body
(sadness, enjoyment, melancholy, be content, be fortunate or unfortunate)
(d) spiritual feelings (feelings of the personality)
spiritual values being and self-value of the (spiritual) 
person himself
(blessedness, desperation, calmness, peace of mind, serenity)
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rior of the human being, so to speak (Sánchez-Migallón 2010). He calls this 
extension “depth” and assigns it four different strata. As shown in Figure 4, 
each stratum is a plane of emotional life where we experience various feel-
ings for which Scheler gives clear examples. It is also of interest that as ob-
jective poles, the feelings in the various strata experience different values 
depending on their range, and that as a subjective pole, the subject feels 
himself in different levels of the structure of human existence.
Scheler differentiates these emotional strata according to several 
properties that gradually develop between them (Box 1). The properties 
mentioned (1–11) arise minimally or not at all in the stratum of sensible 
emotions, and maximally in the spiritual stratum of the emotional life.
Box 1
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The most important property, and that which has attracted most atten-
tion from psychologists and psychiatrists, is without a doubt the ability of 
the feelings in the deeper strata to produce a meaning in the upper strata, 
rather than the other way around. Thus, a sensible pain, for example, can 
be experienced (Figure 3 (a)) differently according to the background of 
a deeper feeling: we can accept it serenely, rebel against it, suffer it with 
others, etc. (Scheler 1992). The idea of feeling therefore acquires an ines-
capable role in the description of emotional life, as manifested clearly in 
emotional pathologies.
2. The neurobiology of emotion
Let us now take a brief look at the findings of emotion-related neurobi-
ological research (McGovern 2007). Three different levels intervene in 
the neurobiology of emotions: the reptile brain, the mammal brain or 
limbic system, and the primate brain or neocortex. The reptile brain is 
the most primitive and it regulates the more mechanical and repetitive 
instinctive behaviours, barely intervening in what we call emotions. The 
limbic system (the amygdala and its connections) is responsible for feel-
ing the worth of something, either positively or negatively, as well as the 
outstanding features of images and thoughts. This system facilitates the 
development of activities that are important for survival, such as spotting 
signs of danger, the need to reproduce, feed and seek cover, although the 
limbic system still responds involuntarily and with poor resolution of de-
tails. However, the connection with the neocortex (especially the ventro-
medial region and the prefrontal cortex) allows more complex and differ-
entiated emotional responses. Most complex activities are elaborated in 
the cortex, such as socialisation, control or clarification of the emotions 
in the limbic system, such that human emotional responses depend on 
the responses to pleasant and painful stimuli mediated by the subcortical 
systems and the cognitive evaluations mediated by the neocortex (Ben-
ninghoff and Drenckhahn 2004; Purves et al. 2004; Nieuwenhuys et al. 
2009).
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However, it should be noted that neuroscientists have used animal 
models to guide their studies and that research with humans is limited 
to observation using neuroimaging techniques, and to the effects of dis-
ease and brain damage. Experimentation beyond this is unviable when the 
stimuli are too invasive or intensive. This means that this type of research 
acquires a fundamentally externally observational perspective, which has 
conditioned the type of emotions that neuroscience of the emotional life 
can study. What is accepted and studied nowadays are the various cerebral 
networks that act in observable emotions in all mammals (fear, seeking, 
etc.), but there is no work on, and at times even no interest in, the range 
of emotional experiences felt by human beings. As it has been rightly said: 
“Neuroscientists have paid most attention to the classical conditioning 
studies conducted with animal models. Almost no attention has been giv-
en to the possibility of multiple emotional systems in the brain. To date, 
the origins of fear in the amygdala have received attention as the dopa-
mine-based ‘reward system’. But interest in the explanation of neural bas-
es of the wide variety of distinctly felt emotional experiences is lacking.” 
(Baars and Gage 2010, 423).
Panksepp (Panksepp 1998) classified the variety of basic emotional 
systems and networks into four categories: seeking, fear, rage and panic. 
Three other general emotional systems are usually added to these four for 
special purposes at the different stages of mammalian development: lust, 
care and play. These systems are neither associated conscious feelings nor 
simply independent brain locations but rather, they are specific connec-
tions. “Fear” and “seeking” are the emotions whose systems have been 
studied in greatest detail due to their strong influence on, and relationship 
with, cognitive processes, and their ease of study in mammals. Neverthe-
less, while these circuits are maintained in all mammals studied and most 
researchers believe that the results can be extrapolated to humans, this 
remains to be confirmed.
The most interesting research findings concerning “fear” in the context 
of this paper are as follows. First of all, there are two routes of neuronal 
transmission in this system (LeDoux 1996): a “low road”, which transmits 
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the signals received in the thalamus to the amygdala directly; and a “high 
road” between the thalamus and the amygdala which passes through the 
cortex. The “low road” permits fast, unconscious yet crude emotional re-
sponses (including “blind” responses, such as in “affective blindsight”). The 
“high road” permits responses through conscious and complex emotions, 
and with the intervention of cognitive content of a social, cultural, per-
sonal nature. The second area of interesting research findings (this time 
from human beings) concerns the latter, in other words the intervention or 
interaction between emotions and cognitive content or processes (Phelps 
and LeDoux 2005). This interaction has been studied with some success in 
five areas: the interaction of emotions with learning and memory model-
ling (especially between the amygdala and the hippocampus); perception 
(especially between the amygdala and the visual cortex); social behaviour 
(especially between the amygdala and the process of recognising emotional 
characteristics in faces); and manipulating emotions. The area of manipu-
lating emotions is the most complex and yet the most promising. It covers 
the range from fear-extinction processes (regulating the receptors in the 
amygdala), to the possible reversion of emotional conditioning responsible 
for traumas of irrational fears, the reconsolidation of memories (inhibiting 
the synthesis of certain proteins) and even the cognitive re-assessment and 
reinterpretation of emotions (where the influence of the cortex is greater, 
altering both the subjective experience and the amygdala physiological 
response).
“Seeking” is the appetitive system which makes mammals curious and 
provokes in them behaviour required to achieve an objective. This is why 
“seeking” has also been called the reward mechanism. It contains three 
interlinked but subjectively and neurologically distinct elements: the he-
donic sensation of “liking”; the learning of rewards; and the “wanting” 
directed towards the main incentive. The latter is a genuine tendency and 
depends fundamentally on the mesolimbic dopamine system rather than 
on the amygdala. Increasing dopamine by any method, as can be achieved 
with drugs, can modify this tendential mechanism. Thus, as before, the 
interaction of this subcortical process with cognitive cortical processes is 
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also possible. Hence, the perception of signs that predict the activity of 
drugs stimulates the dopamine system, which in turn affects the attention 
to those stimuli most related to the drug.
3. Neurobiological and phenomenological perspective
As indicated above, the neurobiological description tends to adopt a per-
spective of external observation that is scientifically more verifiable than 
the subjective experience (internal perception in phenomenological terms). 
However, the subjective experience is also real. Damasio attempted to de-
scribe subjective experiences such as perception or awareness of emotion-
al physiological responses scientifically (Damasio 2003). For this, he has 
drawn up neural maps to represent the brain areas that are active during 
different emotional states [it is debatable whether these maps, and there-
fore these feelings, are exclusive to humans or if they are also shared by 
other mammals (Panksepp 2005)]. The maps would therefore represent 
the correlates of different emotional feelings (Damasio et al. 2000). Influ-
enced by the neurobiological method, Damasio tends to restrict the field 
of subjective sentimental experiences such that they find a neurological 
origin and correlate (Figure 5). Thus, he talks of three types of emotions 
arising from physiological needs (primary or basic emotions, background 
emotions and social emotions). These emotions are the neuronal result of 
these physiological processes. The feelings are the awareness or “percep-
tion of a certain state of the body along with the perception of a certain 
mode of thinking and of thoughts with certain themes” (Damasio 2003). 
The variety of methods of thinking and themes explains the variety of feel-
ings (maintaining the three main classes of emotions), although they are 
subsequent to, and always dependent on, emotions as a neuronal output 
aimed at a physiological balance.
By contrast, and as discussed above, the phenomenological perspective 
allows Scheler to distinguish the classes of emotions or feelings (although 
it makes little sense to differentiate them here). These distinctions, both 
those guided by the intentionality and those that reveal the deep psychic 
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strata, are intrinsic and do not depend on the physiological state of the 
body, and they only become evident by considering the subjective emo-
tional experience. This mode of experience is no less real but rather, only 
these distinctions allow us to understand psychiatric disorders (Harrison 
and Critchley 2007).
Furthermore, these contrasting methodological perspectives not only 
affect the respective classification and understanding of the emotional 
experiences but also, the interactive processes between the emotional and 
cognitive components. In other words, the different perspectives reveal 
the nature of this interaction in a different manner. This can be illustrated 
by the following example. Neuroscience explains how pain or fear can be 
inhibited, for example by distraction or hypnosis, or how an emotion can be 
Figure 5
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reinterpreted and reassessed cognitively (Price et al. 2006). In these cases, 
the awareness or meaning experienced mentally disappears or replaces 
a prior subjective state. In contrast, when phenomenology describes rein-
terpretations or reassessments it indicates that some (deeper) feelings give 
sense or meaning to others (less deep). This is why the same pain can be 
experienced in many different ways. However, one feeling does not replace 
another here —both are maintained— but one intentionally influences the 
other. The phenomenological difference of depth strata and meaning does 
not strictly speaking possess a biological correlate. These experiences can 
only be captured from the paradigm of intentional meaning, and only phe-
nomenology is capable of adopting this perspective.
Conclusion
Neuroscience of the emotional life is developing with the aim of offering 
a broad framework that goes beyond the limits of the specific disciplines 
established to date. It is vital that this field develops with sufficient breadth 
to cover all the information concerning human emotional life, including 
subjective experiences. As such, neuroscience of the emotional life should 
overcome the classical paradigm of the neurobiology of emotion by taking 
on board other disciplines and viewpoints, especially phenomenology.
Current neurobiological and phenomenological research paradigms 
are in some ways still quite irreconcilable (Damasio 2004; Gazzaniga 2011; 
Lombo and Giménez-Amaya 2013, 117–118). In other words we still do not 
have a parallelism between both research methodologies or their para-
digms and correlative frameworks. This makes dialogue difficult, although 
it should nevertheless be attempted. However, if neuroscience of the emo-
tional life wants to be true to its study object, namely human emotional 
life, it cannot concentrate solely on the biological expression of the nerv-
ous system (Murillo 2011). Similarly, phenomenology, which aims to give 
a true description of reality, should also take into account the ever-increas-
ing amount of data from neuroscience. This mutual enrichment appears 
especially promising for psychiatry for both understanding its object and 
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its therapeutic methods (Spiegelberg 1972; Potter 1997; Giménez-Amaya 
and Sánchez-Migallón 2010).
Specifically, the fact not only of the different types of emotions and 
feelings, and especially the unique relationships between them (the inter-
action between emotional states and intentional emotions, and the foun-
dation of meaning between feelings from strata of various depths), requires 
and offers fertile ground for collaboration between neuroscientists, psy-
chologists, psychiatrists and philosophers. Neuroscience of the emotional 
life should therefore seek collaborations with other branches of science 
and other viewpoints (Fuchs 2004), specifically between neuroscientific 
and phenomenological points of view, in order not to forget that we are 
treating people and not just brains, as can clearly be seen in the field of 
psychiatry (Fuchs 2006).
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